Ironically, entry of judgment in opposition to the surety, who admittedly obtained notice, is no less than postponed because the state didn’t establish it gave another person discover. In Jones v. Robbin, 2009 WL (D.S.C. January 21, 2009) the bail agent seized the defendant and surrendered him to the county jail where he remained at the time the swimsuit was filed. The prisoner sued the jail warden and the bail agent alleging that a South Carolina statute on surrender of defendants by bail sureties had not been adopted to the deprivation of the prisoner’s civil rights. The courtroom reviewed and dismissed the professional se grievance for failure to state a claim for aid.
It was clear throughout the file that Granite was the surety, but the decide erroneously entered the judgment against the bail agent, Exit Bail Bonds. Clerical errors in judgments can be corrected, and the courtroom of appeals held that there was no proof the Judge actually meant to hold the agent liable as an alternative of the surety. In People v. American Contractors Indemnity Company, 2003 WL (Cal. App. October 8, 2003) the surety moved to set aside abstract judgment on a bail bond as a result of the abstract judgment had been entered before expiration of the 185 day period during which the defendant’s appearance would exonerate the surety.
The court docket held that the bail bondsman was not a state actor for purposes of the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §1983. In Maloney v. Ohio Department of Insurance, 2004 WL (Ohio App. October 4, 2004) the Court affirmed the Department’s denial of a bail bondsman’s license to a convicted felon. 3905.14 particularly supplies that the superintendent of insurance coverage may deny an application primarily based on such a conviction, and there was no abuse of discretion in doing so on this case.
In Guy Williams, d/b/a Freedom Bail Bonds v. State of Texas, 2003 WL (Tex. App. August 19, 2003) the trial court entered judgment against each, but the state didn’t set up in the document that it had despatched discover to the defendant. Given how simple it will be to indicate mailing of notice, there could also be some implication from the state’s silence that it did not give the notice. On the other hand, Mr. Williams simply submitted an affidavit that to one of the best of his data and perception no notice was given to the defendant. On this ambiguous record the courtroom of appeals held that summary judgment shouldn’t have been granted, vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the trial courtroom.
The court twists around about whether or not the trial court actually lacked jurisdiction to grant the summary judgment. The surety didn’t appeal the abstract judgment and waited until the time in which the court could enter judgment had handed before it moved to set aside the judgment. The courtroom of appeals characterizes this as trifling with the courts.
That is, the bail agent or bail surety needn’t bodily be current in the detention facility when the solicitation occurs or at any other time. Texas law requires that the defendant on a bail bond (as well as the surety) be given discover that the state is looking for a judgment of forfeiture and that the judgment be towards each the defendant and the surety.
The court docket clearly stretched for a method to not let the surety out on what the court considered a technicality, and in doing so admitted that its outcome was inconsistent with two other recent instances. The courtroom held that the untimely judgment was only “voidable” and should have been challenged instantly by enchantment and that the surety was now estopped to make a collateral challenge by motion to set aside the judgment. In State v. Soileau (In re Soileau), 488 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 2007) a bail bondswoman filed for bankruptcy to discharge $650,897.71 of unpaid forfeitures she owed the State. The State moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the State’s immunity underneath the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution prevented the Bankruptcy Court from adjudicating the debt owed the State with out the State’s consent. The Court held that the Bankruptcy Court had in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate the discharge of debts, and the states consented to that jurisdiction by ratifying the Constitution with its Bankruptcy Clause.