In a later version of his wealthy paper, he writes that the communicative content material of a statute (his preferred term is what a statute states) “leaves broad open the query of the contribution it makes to the regulation,” and concedes that the latter query goes “well beyond the philosophy of language.” Neale, The Intentionalism of Textualism 5 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Aside from this official disclaimer, nonetheless, Neale seems to imagine all through that the communicative content of a statute is its contribution to the legislation. Moreover, if the disclaimer were taken seriously, Neale’s paper couldn’t do what it purports to do. For example, his paper claims, on solely linguistic grounds, to dissolve the talk between textualists and intentionalists. But that debate concerns a statute’s contribution to the content material of the legislation, not merely its communicative content.
The concept of the inner point of view plays a specific position in H.L.A. Hart’s principle of regulation, however this post is about a associated but distinct topic–the extra common role that the internal/exterior distinction performs in legal principle. –Causal theories (e.g. a public-selection theory that explains why a particular area of regulation has come to be the way in which it is) are normally stated from the external point of view.
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See supra note 29. This understanding would considerably mitigate the directness of Dworkin’s reliance on the problematic idea that a precept could be law as a result of it is morally good. But, … Read More